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2ABSTRACT
In Lewicki’s (1986a) demonstration of Hidden Co-variation Detection (HCD), responses
were slower to faces that corresponded with a co-variation encountered previously than to
faces with novel co-variations. This slowing contrasts with the typical finding that priming
leads to faster responding, and might suggest that HCD is a unique type of implicit process.
We extended Lewicki’s (1986a) methodology and showed that participants exposed to non-
salient co-variations between hair length and personality were subsequently faster to respond
to faces with those co-variations than to faces without, despite lack of awareness of the
critical co-variations. This result confirms that people can detect subtle relationships between
features of stimuli and that, as with other types of implicit cognition, this detection facilitates
responding.
Co-variation, implicit, non-conscious, social judgement.
3INTRODUCTION
In a series of studies, Lewicki demonstrated that individuals detect subtle relationships
between features of stimuli without concurrent awareness of what is being learned, even
when those features are not overtly relevant to the task in hand (1986a, 1986b; Hill, Lewicki,
Czyzewska & Schuller, 1990; Lewicki, Hill & Czyzewska, 1994; Lewicki, Hill and Czyzewska,
1997). Lewicki (1986a) argued that this Hidden Co-variation Detection (HCD) plays a central
role in social cognition and may be thought of as a non-verbalisable algorithm that biases
social judgements. There is, however, debate about whether HCD represents a unique
cognitive process, as Lewicki implied, or whether it is simply another example of implicit
learning (Hendrickx, De Houwer, Baeyens, Eelen & Van Avermaet, 1997; Hoffmann &
Sebald, 2005); the present study addresses this.
In the Lewicki (1986a) HCD study, the hair length of stimulus faces co-varied with a
particular personality trait, kindness or capability. At test participants were slower to decide
whether for instance, someone with short hair was kind, if people with short hair had been
previously associated with kindness. Lewicki (1986a) interpreted this result on the basis of a
‘question-answering’ model (Glucksberg & McCloskey, 1981), whereby responses are
slower when people have relevant information in memory to search rather than when there is
no information relevant to the question.
This interpretation distinguishes HCD from other priming effects, for example Serial
Reaction Time learning (Nissen & Bullemer, 1987; Nissen, Willingham, & Hartman, 1989)
or artificial grammar learning (Reber, 1967; 1969), where priming is associated with
preferential processing and results in faster or more accurate responses. Moreover this
4interpretation also differentiates the hair/trait HCD task from other HCD tasks where faster
responses to crucial stimuli are an index of learning (Lewicki, Czyzewska and Hoffman,
1987). The ‘question-answering’ model (Glucksberg & McCloskey, 1981) adopted by
Lewicki (1986a) deals with memory search for declarative knowledge, so we question its
applicability to implicit processing. The current study improved upon Lewicki’s (1986a)
original stimuli and methods to investigate whether HCD with social stimuli is a distinct
process or an example of ‘normal’ priming.
Some studies have found it difficult to capture HCD effects (Hendrickx et al, 1997) whilst others
suggest that co-variation learning makes demands upon attentional processes (Hoffmann &
Sebald, 2005). Stamov-Roßnagel (2001) found evidence for the implicit nature of HCD by
showing that HCD effects were seen only after short presentation times and not with
presentations long enough to produce explicit knowledge of the co-variation. Stamov-
Roßnagel’s (2001) study also supported Lewicki et al’s (1997) argument that HCD results from
a naturalistic, ‘global’ processing style by varying participant instructions; HCD only occurred
in the ‘global’ and not the ‘analytical’ condition. In contrast, Hoffmann and Sebald (2005)
found that with the exception of one experiment, co-variation learning only occurred when
participants were consciously aware of the relevant co-variation. However, their task
instructions may have encouraged analytic processing, as they required participants to perform
a visual search and identify a particular type of card (colour or suit) and a particular location.
What emerges from the literature is that type of method, mode of instruction and the nature of
experimental stimuli are critical variables in any attempt to capture co-variation learning in a
laboratory setting. It seems likely that when global processing is encouraged, HCD facilitates
responses in the same way as implicit learning of other types of information. The critical
question is whether, in contrast to Lewicki’s (1986a) findings, HCD also facilitates responding
5when naturalistic, social stimuli are used. We tested this possibility by replicating Lewicki’s
(1986a) hair/trait co-variation study following the original methodology as closely as possible
but improving the stimuli and counterbalancing at acquisition and test stage.
METHOD
Thirty-two male and female undergraduate students completed the HCD task as part of their
psychology course requirements. The task was completed in a quiet testing room in the
Psychology department.
The task was programmed in Psyscope (Cohen, MacWhinney, Flatt & Provost, 1993) and
presented on a Macintosh Powerbook 5300. The critical co-variations were counterbalanced
across participants, as were stimulus orders at acquisition and test (Table 1). Ten black and
white female faces were chosen from an old photograph yearbook that students had
consented to being used for psychological research. Faces were piloted and rated on
dimensions of attractiveness, capability and kindness by undergraduates on a five-point
Likert scale. The faces rated as most attractive were adjusted in Adobe Photoshop to equate
for attractiveness, expression, hair tone and facial symmetry. Further piloting with different
participants confirmed that the adjusted faces were matched for attractiveness, capability and
kindness.
Lewicki (1986a) used different faces for short and longhaired stimuli. To improve stimulus
control and counterbalancing, we graphically manipulated hair length so that each stimulus
face had both long and shorthaired presentations (Figure 1). Short hair was defined as not
reaching the shoulders. Hair length varied in degree of long or shortness so that the co-
variation between hair length and trait remained non-salient at an explicit level.
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7Task instructions were replicated exactly from Lewicki’s (1986a) original study: participants
were told that the stimulus persons were real and were chosen as remarkable, and especially
positive in some way. Participants were instructed merely to look at the faces and listen to the
personality descriptions.
Six faces were presented in the acquisition phase, three with long and three with short hair.
Hair length alternated. Each face was presented for 15 seconds, with 2.5 seconds interval
between presentations when the screen was blank. Auditory files describing the personality of
the stimulus person accompanied the face presentations; the content of auditory files was the
same as in the original Lewicki (1986a) experiment. Three descriptions implied that the
stimulus person was kind and three described the person as capable, for example, ‘she does a
great deal for others’ (kind) or ‘she is intelligent and effective’ (capable). In condition one,
the three longhaired stimulus persons were described as kind, and the three shorthaired faces
as capable; this was reversed for condition two. The acquisition stage was followed by a
simple visual distractor task.
At test, participants were presented with four photographs of previously unseen stimulus
persons, two short and two longhaired. Each stimulus face was exposed twice, accompanied
once by the question ‘Kind?’ and once by the question ‘Capable?’, giving a total of eight
trials in this phase of the task. The two exposures of the same slide were separated by 2-4
other exposures. Measurement of response latency ended when participants pressed either
‘Y’ or ‘N’ on the keypad.
8Table 1: Counterbalancing of faces and personality traits in acquisition and test phases of
hidden co-variation detection task
Key:  L= Long hair, S = Short hair, C = Capable, K = Kind
Group Stimulus order at acquisition and test:
Position in presentation sequence
Condition
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Group 1 Condition 1
Face number and hair length 8L 9S 7L 10S 4L 3S Long hair kind
Soundfile order K1 C1 K2 C 2 K3 C3 Short hair capable
Position of target stimuli at test T T T T
Test order of stimuli 2L 1S 5L 6S 5L 6S 2L 1S
Personality question C K K  C C K K C
Group 2 Condition 2
Face number and hair length 7S 10L 2S 6L 5S 1L Short hair kind
Soundfile order K2 C2 K1 C1 K3 C3 Long hair capable
Position of target stimuli at test T T T T
Test order of stimuli 4S 9L 8S 3L 8S 3L 4S 9L
Personality question K C C K K C C K
Group 3 Condition I
Face number and hair length 2S 6L 5S 1L 4S 9L Long hair kind
Soundfile order C3 K3 C2 K1 C1 K2 Short hair capable
Position of target stimuli at test T T T T
Test order of stimuli 7S 3L 8S 10L 8S 10L 7S 3L
9Personality question C C K K C C K K
Group 4 Condition 2
Face number and hair length 4L 10S 2L 3S 8L 1S Short hair kind
Soundfile order C2 K1 C3 K3 C1 K2 Long hair capable
Test order of stimuli 5L 9S 7L 6S 7L 9S 5L 6S
Position of target stimuli at test T T T T
Personality question K C C C K K C K
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We used Lewicki’s (1986a) explicit measure: participants were given a question sheet asking
whether they based their judgements at test stage on a visual aspect of the person, and if ‘yes’
what aspect of the person?
RESULTS
The four target and four foil reaction times at test for each participant were collapsed to
provide a single mean for primed hair/trait co-variances and a single mean for non-target co-
variances per participant (Table 2).
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Table 2: Reaction time means and standard errors for primed and non-primed co-variances at
test for each condition
Condition Target mean (SE) Foil mean (SE) Difference (SE)
Condition I
Long hair kind, short hair
capable (n = 16) 2811.2 (381.3) 2962.2 (362.5) 151.0 (163.8)
Condition II
Short hair kind, long hair
capable (n = 16) 2586.9 (223.9) 2885.6 (188.5) 288.7 (134.8)
Overall mean score
Condition I and II combined 2699.0 (218.4) 2923.9 (201.1) 224.9 (105.2)
12
A repeated-measures ANOVA tested whether the co-variances at acquisition affected
response times at test. This analysis showed a main effect of stimulus type (primed co-
variance compared to non-primed co-variance), F (1,30) = 4.50, p < .05, with responses to
primed co-variances being faster than responses to unprimed co-variances. There was no
interaction for stimulus type and condition, F (1,30) = .48, p = ns, and no main effect of
condition F (1,30) = .13, p = ns.
HCD appeared to improve performance accuracy as well as speed. Overall, there were fewer
correct responses for foils (42/128) compared to targets (106/128). Mean reaction times were
faster for correct responses to targets than for incorrect responses (M = 2606.2, SE 228.2
compared with M = 3913.3, SE 1222.2). Half the sample had no incorrect responses to target
faces so these data were not analysed further.
If co-variation learning directly influenced judgment to trait questions, we would expect a
greater frequency of ‘yes’ responses to ‘kind?’ questions for longhaired faces and ‘capable?’
questions for shorthaired faces compared to responses for ‘kind’ shorthaired faces and
capable longhaired faces in condition I. In condition II we expected to find the reverse
pattern. These data are presented below in Table 3.
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Table 3. Means and standard deviations of yes-response frequencies for crucial and non-
crucial co-variations in each condition at test stage. Target hair/trait values indicated in bold
for each condition.
Question Condition
I                                                                                       II
KIND?
Long hair
Mean 1.69 1.56
SE 0.48 0.63
Short hair
Mean 1.13 1.75
SE 0.15 0.11
CAPABLE?
Long hair
Mean 1.50 1.69
SE 0.18 0.15
Short hair
Mean 1.56 1.25
SE 0.16 0.17
14
Frequency data for ‘yes’ responses followed the predicted direction indicating that HCD
influenced judgement ratings. Results of a repeated-measures ANOVA showed a main effect
of stimulus type (primed co-variance compared to non-primed co-variance) on frequency of
affirmative responses at test F (1,30) = 6.52, p < .05. There was no interaction for stimulus
type and condition and no effect of condition F (1,30) = .82, p = ns.
For the explicit measure all participants responded ‘yes’ they used some aspect of the person
on which to base their trait ratings. Typical responses were either ‘eyes’ or ‘smile’ or a
combination of both, and this finding corresponds with the results of the original task where
participants made no explicit reference to the hair/trait co-variation.
DISCUSSION
This study replicated Lewicki’s (1986a) original hair/trait co-variation task. Task stimuli
included real faces and the same trait descriptions, explicit measure and participant
instructions as the original task. Our study differed by counterbalancing the hair length and
appearance of each face at acquisition and test. In contrast to Lewicki (1986a), we found
faster responses and greater frequency of ‘yes’ responses at test to novel faces sharing the
crucial co-variations with the previously studied faces, compared to novel test faces without
those co-variations. Our findings of faster RT responses to the relevant stimuli on a HCD task
concord with current assumptions that priming facilitates performance at test, either through
faster RT responses or more accurate or preferential responses to crucial stimuli at test
(Stamov-Roßnagel, 2001; Lewicki, Czyzewska and Hoffmann, 1987). This phenomenon
appears to be an intrinsic and ubiquitous effect of prior stimulus processing and has been
shown across a range of implicit tasks including artificial grammar learning (Reber, 1967,
1969; Gomez & Schvaneveldt, 1994), Serial Reaction Time learning (Nissen & Bullemer,
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1987; 1989; Cohen, Ivry & Keele, 1990; Seger, 1997), dynamic systems learning (Berry &
Broadbent, 1988) hidden co-variation detection (Lewicki, Czyzewska and Hoffmann, 1987;
Lewicki, Hill & Sasaki, 1989; Lewicki, Hill, & Czyzewska, 1994; Roßnagel, 2001),
probabilistic sequence learning (Jiménéz, & Méndez, 2001 ; Jiménéz, Méndez, &
Cleeremans, 1996), mere exposure effect tasks (Zajonc 1968; Moreland & Zajonc, 1979;
Kunst-Wilson & Zajonc, 1980; Elliott & Dolan, 1998; Whittlesea & Price, 2001), learning of
perceptual categories (Jacoby & Brooks, 1984), and visual search tasks (Lewicki, 1986b,
Hoffmann & Sebald, 2005). The effects of processing fluency are represented at a neural
level whereby neuronal firing decreases on the second presentation of a stimulus independent
of attention and awareness (Posner, DiGiralmo & Fernandez-Duque, 1997), supporting the
assumption that such processes are facilitative. Indeed the facilitative nature of prior
processing is so widely reported that Jiménéz and Méndez (2001) suggested a defining
feature of implicit processing effects is that they always function in a uniformly facilitative
way whereas explicit processing effects may be either facilitative or inhibitory. Hoffmann
and Sebald (2005) recently surmised that organisms respond faster to predicted than
unpredicted events and that evolution may have afforded mechanisms that enable automatic
adaptation to environmental co-variations. HCD learning may draw on such adaptive
mechanisms, when adaptation is construed as a facilitative process that produces faster/more
accurate responses when previously co-varying environmental features are re-encountered.
Although our finding of faster and more accurate responses to relevant co-variances at test
fits well with the literature on implicit effects, our results contrast with Lewicki’s (1986a)
results of slower responses to crucial co-variations at test. Slower responses to crucial test
stimuli are consistent with the explanatory framework adopted by Lewicki (1986a), although
the Glucksberg and McCloskey model (1981) seems better suited to deliberative cognitive
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processes than implicit processing effects. The basic tenet of this model is that a memory
search is initiated in response to a question and if nothing is known then a rapid “don’t know”
response is given. The model follows a two-stage process and if relevant information is found
it is further analysed for features that correspond to the question. Response time is therefore
longer when information relevant to a question is available. This model provides a spatial
memory metaphor for information stored in memory that can be verbalised and retrieved via
a deliberative search. However, core features of implicit learning are that the knowledge
acquired is unverbalisable, and that the individual is unaware of both the process
(information acquisition) and the product (subsequent behaviour) of implicit learning. The
‘memory search’ pattern of responding should only be seen when the participant holds some
declarative knowledge relevant to the question. At the test stage of the hair/trait HCD task,
participants are required to respond to the one word question ‘kind?’ or ‘capable?’ presented
below a previously unseen stimulus face. The participants have no information about the
kindness or otherwise of the new faces, they merely hold information that certain beneficent
acts are associated with a certain hair length in some faces seen earlier and that organised and
efficient behaviours are associated with the alternate hair length. It seems unlikely that they
might initiate a two-stage memory retrieval process since they know nothing of the
‘kindness’ or ‘capability’ of the newly seen faces at test.
As it stands the Glucksberg and McCloskey (1981) model seems an unlikely candidate to
explain the results shown by Lewicki (1986a) in the original hair/trait HCD task. An
alternative explanation is Hendrickx et al’s (1996) suggestion that slower responses were an
artefact of poor counterbalancing of test items. We have no information to help evaluate this
criticism. However, with careful counterbalancing in the present study we found that
responses to primed traits were faster not slower.
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On a more general level, several researchers have proposed that certain boundary conditions
must be met before co-variation effects can be captured experimentally. Lewicki et al (1997)
suggested that a global holistic processing style, rather than an analytic investigative style,
must be adopted for the occurrence of HCD. They drew on this argument to explain
Hendrickx et al’s (1997) failure to replicate HCD effects across a range of tasks. They
proposed that this boundary condition is only met by the use of ‘real’ and meaningful stimuli
that induce the automatic adoption of a processing style. According to Lewicki et al (1997)
this holistic processing ‘style’ is the automatic and ubiquitous modus operandi when
processing social information in naturalistic settings. However matrix scanning tasks and
brain scan HCD tasks do not use naturalistic stimuli, and HCD effects have been shown with
these stimuli, so the need for ‘real life’ stimuli to produce co-variation learning seems
questionable. Type of stimuli may be neither the fundamental or only factor in the adoption
of a particular processing style and processing ‘style’ may be initiated by other factors.
Stamov-Roßnagel’s (2001) recent study comprehensively investigated the boundary
conditions that constrain HCD effects. His findings showed that when participants are
explicitly instructed to adopt an analytical style in a brain scan HCD task, by specifically
focussing on separate quadrants of the ‘scan’ rather than the overall scan, HCD effects were
not seen. Interestingly the crucial role of type of instruction in the adoption of a particular
processing style may not only apply to HCD tasks. Whittlesea and Price (2001) recently
showed similar results in a mere exposure effect task.
Considered together these findings suggest that instructive tasks induce an analytical
processing style that prevents priming across a range of implicit tasks. These findings are also
suggestive of some general-purpose mechanism not specific to a particular subgenus of
implicit learning that can be overridden if instructions/context encourage a deliberative
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approach. Consequently methodological variables may be as crucial as the ‘realistic’ nature
of stimuli used to initiate a global processing style and to capture implicit learning effects.
In the present study, the acquisition of co-varying information led to faster judgements about the
personality traits of stimulus persons who corresponded to the learned co-variation, compared to
stimulus persons who did not. The question remains as to what purpose the mechanism
underlying this performance might serve in naturalistic settings? Implicit information processing
has been traditionally perceived as a ‘lab-based’ phenomenon, with most, if not all, researchers
remaining mute as to the function of these processes (but see Barker, Andrade; & Romanowski,
2004). This predicament led Cleeremans and Jiménéz (2002; pg.1) to speculate, “What is
implicit learning for?” Lieberman (2000) recently provided a partial answer by arguing that
implicit tasks used in the laboratory might employ the same mechanisms recruited during
nonverbal encoding and decoding of social information in normal social functioning. Other
researchers have suggested that implicit processes are crucial to social cognition by mediating
language acquisition, affective judgements, socialisation and the development of a sense of
aesthetics (Reber, 2002; Zajonc, 1968; 1980).
The common strand that unites these proposed ‘real-world’ analogues of implicit effects is
the notion that contextual regularities are detected and automatically processed and that this
function might depend upon a common mechanism that is recruited across disparate implicit
tasks and is fast, uniformly facilitative, non-verbal and able to concurrently encode several
variables. In natural settings this sub-symbolic or implicit mechanism may function to ‘catch’
regular co-variances or constancies in the environment and modulate behaviour accordingly
without recourse to conscious deliberative processes. Such a proposed mechanism seems
entirely suited to the realm of non-verbal social cognition. A new departure for implicit
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research might involve investigations of the contribution of sub-symbolic processes to other
aspects of cognition and the putative contribution that implicit cognition makes to social
behaviour. In conclusion, the mechanism underlying co-variation detection may function to
detect and preferentially attend to repeated presentations of subtle co-occurring regularities
amongst a stream of inchoate stimuli, of which the most salient might be social stimuli.
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